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Abstract---Several years of academic and industrial research
efforts have converged to a common understanding on fundamen-
tal security building blocks for the upcoming Vehicular Commu-
nication (VC) systems. There is a growing consensus towards
deploying a Vehicular Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI) enables
pseudonymous authentication, with standardization efforts in
that direction. However, there are still significant technical issues
that remain unresolved. Existing proposals for instantiating the
VPKI either need additional detailed specifications or enhanced
security and privacy features. Equally important, there is limited
experimental work that establishes the VPKI efficiency and
scalability. In this paper, we are concerned with exactly these
issues. We leverage the common VPKI approach and contribute
an enhanced system with precisely defined, novel features that im-
prove its resilience and the user privacy protection. In particular,
we depart from the common assumption that the VPKI entities
are fully trusted and we improve user privacy in the face of
an honest-but-curious security infrastructure. Moreover, we fully
implement our VPKI, in a standard-compliant manner, and we
perform an extensive evaluation. Along with stronger protection
and richer functionality, our system achieves very significant
performance improvement over prior systems - contributing the
most advanced VPKI towards deployment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular Communication (VC) systems enable a multitude
of applications, disseminating warnings on environmental haz-
ards, traffic conditions and other location-relevant information
[1], [2]. At the same time, the need to secure VC systems
and protect their users’ privacy has been long and well un-
derstood [3], and academia and industry have worked towards
addressing these challenges. The common understanding is to
use public key cryptography: long-term credentials (and keys)
for accountable identification of the VC on-board platform
(termed the vehicle for simplicity), in conjunction with short-
term anonymized credentials, broadly termed pseudonyms, for
limited unlinkability of vehicle-originating messages. Projects
on both sides of the Atlantic developed systems based on
this approach (Secure Vehicle Communication (SeVeCom) [4],
CAMP [5], IEEE 1609.2 WG [6]), in cooperation with har-
monization (Car-to-Car Communication Consortium [7], [8])
and standardization (European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI) [9], [10]) bodies.
The cornerstone of all these efforts, along with continuing
work towards Field Operational Testing (FOT), is a Vehicular
Public-Key Infrastructure (VPKI) that comprises a set of
authorities with distinct roles: the Long Term Certification Au-
thority (LTCA), the Pseudonym Certification Authority (PCA),
and the Resolution Authority (RA). The LTCA is responsible
for issuing Long Term Certificates (LTCs), in principle one
per vehicle. The PCA issues sets of pseudonyms to each
vehicle registered with an LTCA. Both the LTCA and the
PCA can revoke the credentials they issued. When necessary,
e.g., for investigation purposes, the RA can initiate a process
to reveal the long-term identity of a vehicle, based on a set of
pseudonymously authenticated messages. This separation of
duty provides conditional anonymity, revoked under special
circumstances, while ensuring that only legitimate vehicles can
obtain pseudonyms and accountably participate in the system.
Challenges and Contributions: With basic concepts under-
stood, there are few works that crisply define VPKI compo-
nents. On that front, we advance the state-of-the-art, enhancing
our earlier work for a multi-domain VPKI [11], [12], with a
more complete system. Our protocols presented here and their
novel features render the VPKI more robust to misbehaving
vehicles. In particular, even in a future environment with
a multiplicity of LTCA and PCA servers, it is impossible
for a compromised vehicle to obtain multiple credentials
valid simultaneously (i.e., set the ground for Sybil-based [13]
misbehavior), and thus harm the VC operations. Moreover, we
propose a generic pseudonym lifetime determination approach
to enhance message unlinkability, thus user privacy.
So far, it has been assumed, often implicitly, that the
VPKI servers are fully trustworthy. Nonetheless, the prospect
of having multiple such servers commercially deployed, in
diverse environments under different regulations, makes this
assumption less realistic. In fact, one cannot preclude servers
that are honest, i.e., follow specified protocols and protect
their private keys, but they may be curious, i.e., tempted to
trace clients (vehicles) if given the opportunity. For example,
to offer customized services or optimize own operations. The
experience from other mobile applications and location-based
services hints this is a realistic threat to user privacy. To
address this challenge, we extend our adversary model by
considering honest-but-curious servers and design our VPKI
to be resilient against such behaviors.
Last but not least, very few works provided detailed ex-
perimental validation of their VPKI designs to show the
performance and availability of their systems. To address
this challenge, we develop a standard-compliant full-fledged,
refined, cross-platform VPKI and present an extensive experi-
mental evaluation. Using the similar setup as in the literature,
to have a meaningful and direct comparison, we find that
our system achieves very significant improvement over prior
art. With contributions on these three dimensions, we advance
towards a more robust and scalable concrete VPKI system.
In the rest of the paper, we describe the system and
adversarial model considered (Sec. II) and move on with the
design of our system (Sec. III). We then analyze the protocols
(Sec. IV) and present extensive experimental evaluation (Sec.
V), before related work (Sec. VI) and conclusions (Sec. VII).
II. SYSTEM & ADVERSARIAL MODEL AND OBJECTIVES
System model & assumptions: We assume a VPKI ar-
chitecture with distinct entities (LTCA, PCA, and RA), and
we define a domain as the set of vehicles registered with
one LTCA, subject to the same administrative regulations and
policies. We do not dwell on the formation of such domains
(geographic regions, cities, states, or otherwise). We assume
that the LTCA is reachable by vehicles registered with it.
Furthermore, we assume multiple PCA servers, active in one
or across multiple domains, which have already established
trust (security associations) with the corresponding LTCA(s).
Each vehicle has a unique membership, registered to one
domain, its home domain; it can freely obtain pseudonyms
from any PCA in its home or in a foreign domain.1 We assume
that across different domains, trust is established with the
help of a higher-level authority, Root Certification Authority
(RCA), or a set of such authorities and cross-certification.
Adversary model: We adhere to the assumed adversarial
behavior defined in the literature [3] and we are primarily
concerned with adversaries that seek to abuse the VPKI.
With the multi-domain, thus multi-PCA, environment, internal
adversaries raise a specific challenge: they could seek to
obtain multiple pseudonyms valid simultaneously over the
same period of time. This would allow them to act as multiple
legitimate vehicles at the same time, e.g., injecting multiple
bogus messages and possibly control the outcome of specific
protocols, e.g., involving voting [15]. In addition, we care
about external adversaries that may mount a clogging Denial
of Service (DoS) attack against the VPKI servers.
We are further concerned with VPKI servers that are honest-
but-curious. A VPKI server could have access to eavesdropped
vehicle communications, that is transcripts of anonymized
signed messages. Then, with knowledge obtained from the
VPKI operations, if it is able to link pseudonym sets provided
to the same vehicle, it could create traces of vehicle activities,
thus perform a sort of user profiling. In the worst case, multiple
servers could collude, i.e., share knowledge.
Objectives: We seek to improve the protection achieved
by strengthening the robustness of the VPKI to adversarial
attacks, notably in the light of a multi-domain setup. Moreover,
1In the context of VC systems, the notion of a foreign certificate was first
introduced in [14].
Fig. 1. System Overview
we seek to improve the VPKI in rendering it more resilient
to honest-but-curious servers. The motivation for the latter
stems from experience in other areas of mobile computing:
service providers tend to amass information in an attempt to
profile clients. Although recent VPKI proposals separate duties
among servers [11], [16], no design explicitly sought to pre-
vent such tracking. We wish to maintain standard-compliant
functionalities, but at the same time protect privacy. Last but
not least, we wish to significantly improve the efficiency of the
VPKI demonstrated through detailed experimental evaluations,
towards scalable VC system deployment.
III. OUR SOLUTION
A. System Overview
Fig. 1 illustrates our proposed VPKI with two domains.
The LTCA registers vehicles and maintains their long-term
identities. It then authenticates registered vehicles and grants
them access to credential management services, prominently
to obtain pseudonyms. To do so, the vehicle obtains a native
ticket from its home LTCA (H-LTCA) and it presents it to
any PCA of its choice (e.g., one easily accessible, available,
mandated, or simply preferred). The tickets are anonymized,
in order not to reveal the vehicle identity to the PCA. At the
same time, the ticket issuance protocol does not reveal to the
LTCA the targeted PCA or the actual pseudonym acquisition
period.
If the vehicle moves to another domain, say from Sweden
to Germany, it can request from its home LTCA to obtain
a foreign ticket without revealing the targeted foreign LTCA
(F-LTCA). It then presents the foreign ticket to the German
LTCA, to obtain a ticket to present to any associated PCA.2
This way, the PCA in the German domain (in our example)
will not be able to classify its requester separately from other
local German vehicles. This is further analyzed in Sec. IV.
2The notions of native and foreign tickets are transparent to the home LTCA
based on the protocol design.
TABLE I
NOTATION USED IN THE PROTOCOLS
Lk Long-term Private Key
LK Long-term Public Key
kiv Pseudonymous Private Key
Kiv Pseudonymous Public Key
P iv Pseudonymous Certificate
CAid Certification Authority Unique Identifier
LTC Long Term Certificate
Cert(LTC,msg) Processing of Signing on msg
σCA Signature of Certification Authority
t Timestamp
N Nonce
ts Starting Timestamp
te Ending Timestamp
SN Serial Number
H() Hash Function
tktexpiry Ticket Expiration Time
The vehicle interacts with any PCA to obtain new
pseudonyms, fetch Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) [14],
[17], or validate pseudonym revocation status using the Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [18]. OCSP requests are
authenticated with a current valid pseudonym. The overall
multi-domain operations (e.g., ticket and pseudonym acqui-
sition in a foreign domain) are assisted by directory services
(Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP)). In case of
misbehavior (e.g., detected locally by vehicles [19] or for
other reasons [20]), the RA is able to resolve a pseudonym
and possibly revoke the pseudonyms and the LTC of the
misbehaving vehicle. We assume that the certificates of RCAs
are pre-installed to On-Board Units (OBUs) (referred to as
the vehicle for simplicity) and that the VPKI servers and the
vehicles are loosely synchronized. All protocols are run over
Transport Layer Security (TLS), with mutual authentication
for obtaining tickets, and with unidirectional (server-only) au-
thentication for obtaining pseudonyms and for LDAP queries.
Table I summarizes notation used in the constituent protocols.
Within a domain, the issuance of pseudonyms is regulated by
the same policy, further explained in Sec. IV.
B. VPKI Services and Protocols
Vehicle Registration and LTC Update (Fig. 2): Each
vehicle is registered to its home LTCA and it is issued an LTC.
The vehicle generates a pair of public and private keys, LKv
and Lkv. The prepared Certificate Signing Request (CSR) [21]
is sent to the home LTCA.
Pseudonym Provision (Fig. 3): The vehicle, V, calculates
the hash value of the concatenation of the desired PCAid and
a 256-bits random number; it chooses the desired time interval,
[ts, te] for which it will request pseudonyms, and appends its
LTCv to the ticket provisioning request. The protocol to obtain
a ticket is:
V −→ LTCA :H(PCAid‖Rnd256), ts, te,LTCv, N, t
LTCA −→ V : tkt,N + 1, t
V LTCA
1. LKv, Lkv
2. (LKv)σLkv , N, t
3. Cert(LTCltca, LKv)
4. LTCv, N + 1, t
Fig. 2. Vehicle Registration and LTC Update
V LTCA PCA
1. H(PCAID ‖Rnd256), ts, te, LTCv, N, t
2. Cert(LTCltca, tkt)
3. tkt,N + 1, t
4. tkt, Rnd256, ts′ , te′ , {(K
1
v )σk1
v
, ..., (Knv )σkn
v
}, N ′, t
5. Cert(LTCpca, P
i
v)
6. {P 1v , . . . , P
n
v }, N
′ + 1, t
Fig. 3. Ticket and Pseudonym Acquisitions
The format of a ticket, signed by the LTCA, is:
tkt = {SN,H(PCAid‖Rnd256), ts, te, tktexpiry}σLTCA
With the ticket obtained, the vehicle initiates the protocol
to obtain pseudonyms:
V −→ PCA : Rnd256, t′s, t′e, tkt, {(K1v)σk1
v
, ..., (Knv )σkn
v
}, N ′, t
PCA −→ V : {P 1v , . . . , Pnv }, N ′ + 1, t
The PCA verifies the hash value in the ticket by hashing
the concatenation of its own identity and the provided random
number. This ensures the ticket was issued for this PCA for
the exact said time interval. A CSR, (Kiv)σki
v
, is the signed
public key generated by the vehicle. The period of requested
pseudonyms, t′s and t′e, fall within the period of the ticket,
[ts, te]. Each pseudonym, signed by the PCA, is:
P iv = {SN,K
i
v, [t
i
s, t
i
e]}σPCA
Each CSR includes the proof of possession of the corre-
sponding private key, kiv [22]. Otherwise, the PCA does not
issue pseudonyms for the requester. If the proof of possession
on a Kiv fails, the PCA assumes a fault; it issues pseudonyms
for the correctly signed Kiv and replies with an appropriate
error message for the invalid signature. However, if the
number of invalid proofs of possessions reaches a threshold,
the PCA deems the requester malicious and aborts.
Foreign Domain Pseudonym Acquisition (Fig. 4 and 5):
A vehicle crossing into a foreign domain obtains a foreign
ticket (f-tkt) issued by its home LTCA without disclosing the
targeted domain. To obtain an f-tkt from H-LTCA:
V LDAP H-LTCA
1. LDAP Req.
2.LDAP Search
3. LDAP Res.
4. H(F -LTCAID ‖Rnd256), ts, te, LTCv, N, t
5. Cert(LTCltca, f -tkt)
6. f -tkt,N + 1, t
Fig. 4. Roaming User: Foreign Ticket Authentication
V F -LTCA PCA
1. f -tkt,H(PCAID||Rnd
′
256
), Rnd256, N, t
2.Cert(LTCltca, n-tkt)
3. n-tkt,N + 1, t
4. n-tkt, Rnd′
256
, ts′ , te′ , {(K
1
v)σk1
v
, ..., (Knv )σkn
v
}, N ′, t
5. Cert(LTCpca, P
i
v)
6. {P 1v , . . . , P
n
v }, N
′ + 1, t
Fig. 5. Native Ticket and Pseudonym Acquisition in the Foreign Domain
V −→ H-LTCA :H(F -LTCAid‖Rnd256), ts, te,LTCv, N, t
H-LTCA −→ V :f -tkt,N + 1, t
To obtain a native ticket (n-tkt) in the foreign domain, the
vehicle sends its foreign ticket (instead of its LTCv) to the
LTCA in the foreign domain, after finding its certificate with
the help of an LDAP server (similar to Fig. 3).
Pseudonym Resolution & Revocation (Fig. 6): The Res-
olution Authority (RA), in case of misbehavior, can resolve
a pseudonym with the help of the PCA and the LTCA. The
RA first asks the PCA to map the transcript pseudonyms to
the corresponding ticket (which the PCA returns). Then, the
RA queries the LTCA to have the vehicle identified (as the
LTCA can map the ticket to the long-term credentials of the
vehicle). In case of a cross-domain resolution, one additional
step, involving the foreign LTCA makes the link to the H-
LTCA, is needed. Steps 1, 2 and 3 in Fig. 6 show the process
to resolve a ticket and possibly revoke the pseudonyms. The
PCA adds all the valid pseudonyms, issued for the ticket, to
the CRL. Steps 4, 5 and 6 show the process to identify the
vehicle and revoke its LTC.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Our primary concern is to analyze the achieved security and
privacy considering the honest-but-curious VPKI servers. We
present these findings in Sec. IV-A. Then, in Sec. IV-B, we
explain how arbitrary pseudonym request times along with
pseudonym lifetimes can provide significant information to
RA PCA LTCA
1. Pi, N, t
2.Update CRL
3. tkt,N + 1, t
4.SNtkt, N
′, t
5.Resolve LTCv
6.LTCv, N
′ + 1, t
Fig. 6. Pseudonym Resolution and Revocation
TABLE II
NOTATION USED IN SECURITY ANALYSIS
LTCAA LTCA of domain A
PCAAi PCAi in domain A
PCAA A set of PCAs in domain A
idA Identities of the vehicles in domain A
PA Pseudonyms issued by the PCAs in domain A
any adversary (eavesdropper) to link pseudonyms and thus
messages. Accordingly, we explain how our policy, enforced
at PCAs, can mitigate this threat. Table II summarizes notation
used in the security analysis.
Communication integrity, confidentiality, non-
repudiation: This is achieved thanks to the use of secure
channels (TLS) for vehicle to VPKI communication, while
security associations allow any server to authenticate
messages generated by any other server (notably, tickets).
Digital signatures and certificates ensure non-repudiation.
Authentication and authorization: The LTCA makes the
appropriate decisions, based on the registration of the vehicle,
its status (revoked or not), and the use of its long-term
credentials. The PCA grants the service, the pseudonyms,
by validating the LTCA signature, based on their prior trust
establishment. Trust associations of PCAs and LTCAs are
made known to vehicles through LDAP services.
Thwarting Sybil-based misbehavior: The LTCA keeps the
records of the issued tickets. Upon receiving a request, the
LTCA checks whether a ticket was issued to the vehicle for
that period. This ensures that no vehicle can request more
than one ticket for any period. As a ticket is bound to a
specific PCA and the PCA keeps records of ticket usage, a
ticket cannot be reused for other PCAs. This implies that at
any point in time, the vehicle cannot obtain more than one
pseudonym sets (thus pseudonyms) valid simultaneously. This
means that one cannot act as more than one entity.
Concealing pseudonym providers, foreign identity
providers and actual pseudonym acquisition period: By
sending H(PCAid‖Rnd256), ts, te, LTCv to the LTCA, the
vehicle reveals its long-term identity, LTCv, but it hides the
targeted PCAid (and the targeted LTCAid in case of foreign
ticket request) and the actual requested interval, [t′s, t′e]. The
TABLE III
INFORMATION HELD BY HONEST-BUT-CURIOUS ENTITIES
Honest-but-curious (colluding) Entities Information Privacy Implications
LTCAA idA, ts, te An LTCA knows during when the registered vehicles wish to obtain pseudonyms.
PCAAi ts, te, PAi A PCA can link the pseudonyms it issued for a same request, but cannot link those for different requests.
LTCAA, PCAA idA, ts, te, PA The pseudonyms they issued can be linked and the vehicle identities within the same domain can be derived.
LTCAA, LTCAB idA, idB, ts, te Collusion among LTCAs from different domains does not reveal additional information.
PCAA, PCAB ts, te, PA, PB Collusion among PCAs from different domains does not reveal additional information.
LTCAA, LTCAB, PCAA, PCAB idA, idB, ts, te, PA, PB
Colluding LTCAs and PCAs can link the pseudonyms they issued. The vehicle identities can be derived,
as long as the issuers of the pseudonyms and the corresponding tickets collude.
PCA, then, verifies if [t′s, t′e] ⊆ [ts, te] and grants pseudonyms
accordingly.
A. Honest-but-curious Authorities
Table III outlines the information held by honest-but-
curious, possibly colluding, authorities within the same do-
main or across domains. We do not consider the RA because
it does not hold information on unresolved pseudonyms. Of
course, a malicious (but, not honest-but-curious) RA could
unnecessarily initiate resolutions. Collusion among the LTCA
and the PCAs from the same domain enables them to link
vehicle identities to issued pseudonyms. Moreover, collusion
among LTCAs and PCAs from different domains further
enables them to link vehicle identities to pseudonyms issued
for foreign tickets.
B. Tickets and Pseudonym Lifetime Policies
Consider a set of vehicles and their pseudonyms issued in
a fully flexible, on-demand manner, with a policy allowing
pseudonyms with any lifetime. A transcript of pseudony-
mously authenticated messages can lead to linked pseudonyms
simply by inspecting their (successive) lifetimes. In Fig. 7.a,
the first pseudonym in row 7 is the only one valid at time 1,
with lifetime 10; and then there is a single pseudonym (in row
8, from the same vehicle) valid at time 11, thus making the
linking of the two trivial.
In contrast, Fig. 7.b illustrates how one can mitigate this
vulnerability: the vehicle can request pseudonyms at any point
in time, but the PCA must, according to the domain policy,
issue all its pseudonyms according to fixed lifetimes, equal
for all requesting vehicles. With the additional requirement
to ensure that there is no backward overlap, by controlling
the request interval, the PCA aligns all pseudonym lifetimes.
This removes any distinction among different sets, resulting
in an anonymity set equal to the number of (active) requests.
A similar policy should also be applied to ticket acquisition.
Although [ts, te] is protocol selectable, the LTCA fixes this
to be the same for all tickets; this prevents a PCA that
serves successive requests from linking tickets (similarly to
the flexible pseudonym lifetime case). Of course, the actual
request from the vehicle to the PCA can be any sub-interval
of [ts, te].
Clearly, there is a trade-off in this approach: the longer
the interval to obtain pseudonyms (or the ticket validity), the
less frequent the vehicle-VPKI communication, but the higher
the chance to overprovision a vehicle (e.g., if the period
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Fig. 7. Pseudonym lifetime policy (Each color shows the non-overlapping
pseudonym lifetimes for a vehicle.)
includes no movement), and vice-versa. Further discussion
on an optimal choice and implementation considerations (e.g.,
connection to the vehicle mobility, level of unlinkability and
thus pseudonym lifetime) are out of the scope of this paper.
V. EVALUATION
We are primarily interested in assessing the efficiency of the
full-blown implementation of our VPKI, notably measuring
the performance both on the client (vehicle) and the server
sides. We capture this by measuring protocol execution delays
experienced on the vehicle side, as well as measuring delays
for individual protocol steps. To gauge the availability of the
system, its ability to remain operational in the face of failures,
we perform two experiments: (i) a crash failure of one PCA,
and (ii) a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) of increasing
intensity against a PCA and an LTCA.
Summary of findings: We demonstrate a highly efficient
VPKI system, comparing its performance to the state-of-the-
art for the similar experimental setup. In particular, we have
a four-fold acceleration compared to the best previous results.
Essentially, the more efficient the VPKI and the lower the
overhead/cost for the vehicles, the higher the scalability of the
system (being able to service more vehicles per deployed pro-
cessing power unit). At the same time, the more effective and
easier the vehicle-VPKI interactions are. Finally, as expected,
back-up processing power renders the system dependable.
A. Experimental Setup
We allocate resources to distinct VPKI servers and we
emulate the VC system, notably, the population of registered
vehicles. We carry out the experiments in a controlled vir-
tualized environment, with servers and vehicles running on
Virtual Machines (VMs). This essentially eliminates network
TABLE IV
SYSTEM SETUP AND POLICIES
Type of Experiments Pseudonyms Execution Time Frequency Number of Vehicles
Ticket & Pseudonym Acquisition (Fig. 8) 1-1K 50 times - -
Pseudonym Acquisition (Fig. 9 & 10.a) 100 1h 6/h 10K
Pseudonym Acquisition (Fig. 10.b) 10-200 1h 10/h 10K
DDoS Attacks (Fig. 11) 100 1h 6/h (Attackers: 360/h) 10K (Attackers: 0-20K)
Fetching CRL (Fig. 12.a) 1K-100K (Revoked) 1h 6/h 10K
OCSP Operations (Fig. 12.b) 0.5K-4K (Revoked) 1h 6/h 10K
Pseudonym Resolution (Fig. 13) 1 50 times - -
TABLE V
SERVERS AND CLIENTS SPECIFICATIONS
LTCA PCA RA Clients
VM Number 2 5 1 25
Dual-core CPU (Ghz) 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
BogoMips 4000 4000 4000 4000
Memory 2GB 2GB 1GB 1GB
Database MySQL MySQL MySQL MySQL
Web Server Apache Apache Apache -
Load Balancer Apache Apache - -
Emulated Threads - - - 400
propagation delays, which would vary greatly based on the
vehicle-VPKI connectivity, thus allowing us to isolate the
effect of our protocols. Tables IV and V show the system setup
and the servers and clients specifications respectively. We con-
sider large sets of clients, 10K threads on 25 VMs, executing
protocols with (sending requests to) the VPKI servers. We ex-
periment under various conditions (configurations, parameters
and policies). We gradually increase the load to investigate
the behavior of the VPKI servers. Our implementation is
in C++ and we use OpenSSL for cryptographic operations
and algorithms, including: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) and TLS. As ETSI and IEEE 1609.2
propose, the ECDSA key size is 256 bits [2], [6], although
other key sizes are also acceptable. It is important to note that
the emulated vehicle resources are modest, much lower than
the anticipated cryptographic processing power in ongoing
FOTs (e.g., [23]). Thus, one can expect even better results
overall.
B. Results & Analysis
1) Ticket & Pseudonym Provisioning: Fig. 8 shows the
delay to obtain pseudonyms for each component, ticket provi-
sioning, pseudonym verification, the PCA processing delay
and network transmission delay.3 The processing time to
generate public/private keys is not considered here, as they can
be generated off-line on the vehicle. For example, the delay
to obtain 100 pseudonyms is around 500 ms. Fig. 9 shows the
average response time for the LTCA to issue a ticket, approx-
imately 5 ms (including request decapsulation, verification of
the LTC, ticket issuance and response encapsulation).
Fig. 10.a shows the average response time of the PCAs for
issuing 100 pseudonyms (request decapsulation, ticket certifi-
cate chain verification, verification of proof of possessions for
3Again, the lab environment dwarfs this, but it is deliberate to factor this
out as it is orthogonal to our design. It was also done so in the works we
compare to. A separate investigation taking into account the access networks
is interesting future work.
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Fig. 10. PCA processing delay
each public key, issuance of pseudonyms and encapsulation of
the response). The system configuration here requests from the
PCAs to issue 100 pseudonyms every 100 minutes per vehicle.
The shadowed area shows the period during which one of the
servers instantiating the PCAs was forced to crash. We see
that the responsiveness of the PCA remains unscathed.
Fig. 10.b shows the performance of the PCAs issuing
different numbers of pseudonyms. For example, the cumula-
tive probability of delays for obtaining 200 pseudonyms is:
Fx(t = 500) = 0.9, or Pr{t ≤ 500} = 0.9. This confirms the
system can scale: obtaining more than 120 pseudonyms every
10 minutes (pseudonym lifetime of 5 sec.) is considered as
a quite demanding case, considering current expectations that
one pseudonym per day or per trip is used [7]. Of course, this
is a function of the number of registered vehicles and the PCA
processing power. But we see that a modest machine can serve
thousands of demanding vehicles.
DDoS Attack: External adversaries could clog the LTCA
or the PCA with spurious, bogus requests.4 They can send
requests to the LTCA with fake certificates, or to the PCA with
4Similarly for the RA, but as it is less critical for the real-time operations
of the VC system, we do not investigate here.
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Fig. 11. VPKI servers under a DDoS attack
fake tickets. We set a high request frequency, on the average
once per 10 seconds, increasing the number of adversarial
nodes acting this way up to 20K. Fig. 11 shows the responsive-
ness of an LTCA and a PCA under DDoS. The average num-
ber of legitimate serviced requests per second for the LTCA
drops by half for 10K attackers. While the same happens for
the PCA only for 500 attackers. This is naturally so, because
both servers have the same resources, but the overhead for
providing pseudonyms is much higher than that for providing
a ticket. One can suggest allocating higher resources to the
PCA, or employing DDoS mitigation techniques appropriate
for the limited client (vehicle) resources, e.g., puzzles [24].
2) Revocation: Fig. 12.a illustrates performance when 10K
vehicles query the PCAs, once every 10 minutes on average, to
fetch the CRL; with different numbers of revoked pseudonyms,
from one to one-hundred thousand (1K to 100K). For example,
for a CRL with 50K revoked pseudonyms, Fx(t = 280) = 0.9,
or Pr{t ≤ 280} = 0.9. Fig. 12.b shows the performance when
the same client population checks the revocation status of 500
to 4,000 different pseudonyms. We reckon that OCSP would
not be used for such high numbers of pseudonyms. Still, the
system can comfortably handle such demanding load.
3) Pseudonym Resolution: Fig. 13 shows the delay to
resolve and revoke a pseudonym. As PCA databases could
be gigantic, we evaluate resolution for 10,000 to 5 million
pseudonyms. Pseudonym resolution and revocation is comfort-
ably handled, in around 100 ms.
4) Performance Comparison: We compared the relevant
results5 directly to the performance results presented in [11],
[12], [16], exactly because we use very similar setup. We see
we achieve significant improvements in terms of efficiency
and performance. The main reasons for such significant im-
provements, given protocols of very similar message complex-
ity, are: multi-threading implementation and use of database,
code and memory usage optimization techniques. The result
of these can be a 4-fold improvement, e.g., the processing
delay to issue 10 pseudonyms for the PCA for SEROSA [16]
is around 100 ms, while it is approx. 26 ms in our system.
5CRL and OCSP operations and resiliency to DDoS attacks were not
considered in related works.
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VI. RELATED WORK
The SeVeCom project [25], and its continuation, Preparing
Secure Vehicle-to-X Communication Systems (PRESERVE)
[26], have led to a VPKI instantiation compliant to the
Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) framework.
Because of direct PCA - LTCA communication at the time
of pseudonym provision, the LTCA knows the pseudonym
providing PCA, thus it can easily link messages. Similarly,
the Security Credential Management System (SCMS) [5]
requires that the identity provider forwards requests to PCAs,
thus being prone to the same inference.6 The linking of the
pseudonym request (and thus long-term identity) to a specific
PCA and the request timing (and thus an easy to guess set
of pseudonyms and signed messages) is possible for VeSPA
and its extension [11], [12]: they leverage an anonymized
ticket but the LTCA still knows when the ticket will be
used to obtain pseudonyms and from which PCAs. Our VPKI
addresses this concern, providing improved security. We also
achieve significant improvement in performance. For example,
to obtain 10 pseudonyms, the processing delays of the PCAs
in VeSPA and our scheme are 300 ms and 26 ms, respectively.
Concerning pseudonym resolution, the V-token scheme [27]
mandates a random checking of V-tokens to prevent vehicles
from binding false identities to pseudonyms. However, an
honest-but-curious LTCA would learn which vehicles the
randomly checked V-tokens belong to. Having this infor-
mation, it can link the (eavesdropped) pseudonyms to the
6Unlike the PRESERVE system, SCMS allows multiple simultaneously
valid pseudonyms held by the vehicle, thus not being concerned with Sybil-
based misbehavior.
vehicle identities by looking at the V-tokens included in the
pseudonyms. CoPRA [28] stores resolution IDs, the hash of
each short-term public key and a random number, at both
the LTCA and the PCA; the honest-but-curious LTCA can
easily calculate hashes of any public key from (eavesdropped)
pseudonyms and link them to the identity of the vehicle. Our
proposal is more general and more robust, further analyzed,
and with detailed experimental evaluation.
SEROSA [16] proposed a general service-oriented security
architecture seeking to bridge Internet and the VC domains.
However, the identity provider can still infer the identity of the
service provider based on the protocol design. Moreover, the
multi-domain environment explicitly addressed by SEROSA
(as was the case for VeSPA, and not elaborated in other
proposals) leaves space for Sybil-based misbehavior. The
infrastructure cannot prevent multiple spurious requests to
different PCAs. Of course, an Hardware Security Module
(HSM) (ensuring all signatures are generated under a single
valid pseudonym at any time) can be a general remedy
to the problem [29]. Our VPKI alone prevents Sybil-based
misbehavior without trusted hardware and it is significantly
more efficient in terms of performance.
Last but not least, an issue relevant to all systems with non-
overlapping pseudonym lifetimes: while seeking to prevent
Sybil-based misbehavior even without trusted hardware (as
long as the misbehaving client cannot requests to multiple
PCAs serviced), linkability could remain easy (Sec. IV). This
was not identified before and our VPKI hints how to address
it through its pseudonym lifetime and ticket validity policy.
Mixing anonymous authentication with classic public key
cryptography was proposed: e.g., in [30] group signatures
allow pseudonym self-generation on-the-fly; or, in [31] group
keys are used as long-term credentials instead of certificates.
Standardization bodies have not yet embraced such approaches.
Moreover, performance evaluation results are available for
Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication [30], [32], but not
for a full-blown credential management system.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Our results primarily show that our VPKI strengthens secu-
rity and privacy protection, extends functionality, and outper-
forms (in response delays) prior proposals. These contributions
lead us closer to a robust and scalable VPKI.
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